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ABSTRACT
Ml'XiAN I’RliNCH: Personality Effects on Perception of Emotion from Audible Cues
(Under the direction of Carol Gohm)

nil lcrences in personality traits lead to varied reactions to emotional judgments(Golim &
CMorc. 2000). It was investigated whether higher levels of emotional clarity, intensity,
and attention improve emotional reaction times and accuracy. Participants reacted to
sounds by indicating the presence and description of emotions. Participants completed
personality scales to determine individual levels of traits. It was found that higher ratings
for any trait were related to accuracy. Faster participants were more accurate in their
responses and increasingly so when possessing higher clarity. This group also had
increased levels of intensity and attention. For those slower, attention was correlated
with accuracy.

Those able to identify an emotion quickly were more accurate in

emotional Judgments.
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Personality Effects on Perception of Emotion from Audible Cues
Numerous studies have investigated the effects of various personality traits

on

people’s everyday lives. These traits influence the way emotions are factored into
decision making and have been shown to affect job performance (Ferdowsian, 2003) and
relationship stability (Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003). Some researchers report these
traits to be an even more relevant factor than the conventional intelligence quota test
(Connolly, 2002). These personality traits can been described as *lhe capacity tor
recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for motivating ourselves, and tor
managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships” (Goleman, 1998). Our
research examines how individual differences in levels of such traits can influence
emotionally relevant decision making skills.
If the notion of everyday life can be broken down to its most fundamental
element, one can find at its base numerous, seemingly minor decisions. These decisions,
building upon one another, can in turn shape the outcome of a day, a week, a year, and a
life. If we can analyze what traits allow us to make these decisions more wisely or
identify the characteristics needed to make this skill more refined, can we then improve
our decisions and thus our lives? For example, in relation to the emotional trait of
attention, if we can determine that people who focus less on their emotions make poorer
decisions than others, we can use this knowledge to help people make better decisions by
focusing more on their emotions.

1

Pro\ i(His research has shown that one’s current emotional state can influence evaluative
Jiiclgments. for example, satisfaction with life in general (Schwarz & Clore, 1983),
likelihood estimates of negative events (Johnson & Tversky. 1983), and satisfaction with
consumer goods (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). However, little research has been
conducted on how individual differences in emotional intelligence affect the processing
ol cmotion-rele\'ant information. Thus, we know very little about whether these
individual differences occur or, if they occur, what they suggest about information
processing.
New work in this area indicates that certain meta-emotion traits, such as levels of
clarity about emotion, emotional intensity, and attention to emotion, are associated with
differences in reactions to emotional situations, and in differences in emotion relevant
judgments(Gohm & Clore, 2000). For example, individuals with a specific combination
of these traits reacted differently than others to an emotional situation, and consequently
made Judgments that were different from everyone else’s Judgments. The proposed
research would explore whether those who scored higher in these personality traits would
react differently to emotional stimuli or perfomi better when making Judgments about the
emotions they are experiencing. For this study, emotion can be defined as a state of
mood that is based upon the goodness or badness of certain cues (Ortony, Clore, &
Collins, 1988).
When looking at the processes required in formulating an emotionally based
decision, a person must go through several stages. First, individuals will generate an
emotion based upon the circumstances and situation surrounding their decision. During
this process, the person would analyze the meaning and/or effects of such an emotion.
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An individual’s aptitude to assess the meanings or effects of an emotion is a trait that has
become known as clarity about emotion. Also, individuals will decide whether ihev feel
this emotion in a small, moderate, or large amount, fhis level of emotion t\ pic;dl\ telt is
referred to as emotional intensity. Lastly in the process, individuals must choose to w hat
degree they will incorporate this emotional input into the decision at hand, fhe amount
of input that a person tends to incorporate is known as attention to emotion.
Often in experiments, participants are unknowingly placed under specific
conditions designed to manipulate their mood in order to increase their clarity, intensity,
or attention. While this serves as a powerful method, some experimenters choose to
identify groups of participants who are naturally different on their levels of these
personality traits. This approach has been shown to have similar effects as the first
(Gasper & Clore, 2000). This study, likewise, follows along with the more natural
selection of participants. In order to determine the presence of participants with such a
variety of individual differences in the occurrence of these personality traits, we asked
them to complete several established personality scales proven to show such differences.
In order to measure the first trait, clarity about emotion, we used subscales of the
Mood Awareness Scale (MAS; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995; see Appendix C) and the
Trait Meta-Mood Scale(TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995; see
Appendix D) that were specifically designed to measure the trait at hand, These
subscales for clarity determine the “individual differences in the ability to identify.
distinguish, and describe specific emotions”(Gohm & Clore, 2000). For the MAS, the
labeling subscale was used. From two past experiments, clarity was found to correspond
with attention to emotion(r= .21 and .21), high self-esteem (r= .35), and extraversion (r
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28). C'laril\- was also negatively coiTelated with an inability to identify emotions(r= .64). the inability to describe emotions(r= -.64), and feelings of social anxiety(r= -.30).
Using the clarit\ siibscale of the TMMS. the capability to differentiate among
different emotions was examined. For this subscale, finding a relationship between the
traits of clarit> and attention is arguable. For Salovey et al. (1995), no connection was
Ibund. But. a study b> Emmons and Colby (1994) found them to be somewhat related (r
= .28).

We found clarity to be related inversely to depression (r = -.27) and a

susceptibility to distress (r = -.44). Also found by Salovey et al. was that people who are
high in emotional clarity are more capable of recovering from negative moods quicker
than people lower in clarity. This is possibly because they do not need to focus on their
emotions for too long to determine how they are feeling(Gohm & Clore, 2000).
In order to ascertain an individual’s level of emotional intensity, we relied on two
valid measures, the first from the Affect Intensity Measure(AIM; Larsen & Diener, 1985,
1987; see Appendix E) and the other from the Emotional Intensity Scale (EIS;
Bachorowski & Braaten, 1994; see Appendix F). The trait of emotional intensity refers
to “the strength with which individuals tend to experience emotions”(Gohm & Clore,
2000) and is seen as a “general temperament dimension of emotional reactivity and
variability” (Larsen & Diener 1987). According to studies of the AIM, those high in
intensity are as likely to experience extreme highs as they are to experience extreme lows
whether in real life or in laboratory settings(Larson, Diener, & Emmons, 1986). Scoring
high in emotional intensity was positively correlated with being sociable(r= .29 to .45),
reactive (r= .39 to .49) and emotional(r= .27 to .57). This, however, was not related to
psychological well being (Larson & Diener, 1987).

4

The EIS (Bachorowski and Braaten. 1994) measures "ihc tendcnc\ to experience
emotions intensely, independent of frequency"(Gohm & Clore. 2000). This scale breaks
intensity down into levels of positive intensity and negative intensity,

I hese two.

positive and negative, however, were only related somewhat(r= .39 and .58 Ibr men and
women, respectively; Bachorowski & Braaten, 1994). For men, the intensity ot'positive
emotions was more strongly related to extraversion than to ncuroticism (r

.49 and .03,

respectively). For women, intensely positive emotions were related to both (r = .36 and
.28, respectively). In comparing the 2 scales, the AIM and EIS, scores were only
correlated somewhat(r= .38 and .45 for men and women, respectively)(Bachorowski &
Braaten, 1994).
The last of these traits, attention to emotion, was measured using other subscales
of the MAS and the TMMS. These subscales “assess the extent to which individuals
monitor their emotions, value their emotions, and maximize their experience of
emotions” (Gohm & Clore, 2000). In the MAS, we use the subscale that identifies
individual differences in mood monitoring, which can be defined as “the tendency to
focus on, evaluate, or scrutinize one’s own mood”(Gohm & Clore, 2000). This trait has
been linked to private self-consciousness(r= .49), empathy (r= .41), and high emotional
intensity(r= .24). For the attention subscale of the TMMS,attention was correlated with
both private and public self-consciousness(r= .42 and .36, respectively) by Salovey et al.
(1995). It was also related to emotional intensity(r= .32) and the belief in the usefulness
of expressing emotions(r= .53) by Emmons & Colby (1994).
In a study performed by Gohm and Clore (2000), some relationships between
these scales were identified. One example is found in that people who are high in
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emotional intensil\ will also tend to express those emotions more than less intense
people. .-\lsi>. people who find importance in their emotions tend to pay more attention to
them. These, as well as others findings, follow through with what would be expected of
these personalit\ traits, however, some relationships were found that were surprising.
Tor instance, it was onl>' weakly found that people who tend to value and attend to their
emotions are. in turn, immersed in their emotions. Also, it was suggested that there is a
group of people who experience very intense emotions, but are increasingly unsure of
what emotions they are experiencing. They may, for example, “realize that they feel very
negative but do not focus more specifically on whether they are angry, disgusted, or
depressed"(Gohm & Clore, 2000).
With all this research done, little has focused on how individual differences in
levels of these personality traits affect the processing of emotionally relevant information.
We set out to determine which, if any of these traits may have an effect on someone’s
decisions. In order to find out whether these differences do occur in individuals and what
effect they may have on information processing, we asked participants to judge several
emotionally significant cues and then follow up by completing the previously listed
standardized personality scales.
The research required subjects to listen to several emotion eliciting sounds to
determine the emotion they experienced because of the sound. The sounds were taken
from the International Affective Digitized Sounds(IADS) collection (Bradley & Lang,
1999). Normative affective ratings (i.e., for pleasure, arousal, and dominance) are
available for these sounds. Examples of sounds include car horn blasts, a man snoring,
and a woman singing in the shower (see Appendixes A and B for complete sound lists).

6

ihc MAS,

Afterwards, the subjects performed such personality asscssnicnis as
EIS, TMMS,and the AIM that would measure clarity about emotion,

emotional intensity.

and attention to emotion. These personality scales, along with the sounds, w ere produced
on a computer through a program written in AuthorWare. Once the data u as

collected.

we checked for correlations between each personality trait and the participants response
times to reporting which emotion they were experiencing and the accuracN

with which

they gave their answers.
As data analysis began for these two distinct groups, several hypotheses were
formed as to how the levels of personality traits would affect the participants
performances. First, for the trait of clarity, which was defined as "individual ditterences
in the ability to identify, distinguish, and describe specific emotions (Gohm & Clore,
2000), it was predicted that those participants that exhibited higher levels of emotional
clarity would be faster in deciding which emotion they experienced as

result of a

particular sound. As these individuals are more practiced in identifying their emotions on
a regular basis, it was expected that the time needed to identify their emotions

would

likely be less on average than that required by those weaker in emotional clarity.
We then hypothesized as to how much the level of clarity would affect a
participant’s ability to choose the specific emotion a stimulus was meant to elicit. It was
predicted that a strong level of clarity would lead to a greater accuracy rating,

In that a

high level of emotional clarity signifies an individual’s ability to recognize specific
emotions, such an individual would be more likely to identify correctly the emotion they
experienced from a list of emotion words. However, clarity about the emotion a
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panicipam ma> feel docs not necessarily suggest that emotion will be the same one the
sound w as meant to produce.
I'or the next personality trait of intensity, defined as *‘the strength with which
indi\ iduals tend to experience emotions"(Gohm & Clore, 2000), it was once again felt
that a higher le\ el of this trait would lead to quicker emotional reaction times. Given that
indixiduals w ho display high levels of emotional intensity experience their emotions at a
signillcantlN greater level than those lower in intensity, we expected they would be better
able to signal the hea\ ier presence of an elicited emotion rapidly. However, a high level
<d emotional intensity does not necessarily require an individual to be capable of either
clearly identifying or pciying attention to that emotion. Therefore, it can be foreseen that
this trait would not automatically make an individual more able to pinpoint the particular
emotion a stimulus may try to elicit without the significant presence of another of these
personality traits.
When judging how much of an effect emotional intensity would have on
individuals’ ability to report an emotion they experienced accurately, it was difficult to
expect that simply feeling something strongly would make an individual more able to
pinpoint a concrete descriptor for that emotion correctly. However, if an effect were to
be predicted, it can be presumed that an increased intensity level would make an elicited
emotion easier to identify correctly for an individual.
Last, with the trait of attention, which was defined as “the extent to which
individuals monitor their emotions, value their emotions, and maximize their experience
of emotions”(Gohm & Clore, 2000), we felt that a higher level of emotional attention
would likely produce faster reaction times as well. If people who exhibit a high level of
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this trait often examine the emotions they experience ai an\
icLila. tini--- ii is expected
A panic
that, when called upon to attend to their emotions c|uickl\. llie\ ut>Lild p rove more
capable than individuals who rarely focus on their emotions.
When evaluating the effect emotional attention may con\ c>

onto iUi

in dividual's

ability to report accurately the emotion given olT IVom a particular St i nul l us, it was
believed that attention to emotion would positively affect reporting accurae> .
individuals were more likely to focus on the emotions the\ felt, it ean

11' certain

he ass umed that

they would also be more able to identify those emotions w hen read Irom a

list. Then

again, individuals highly attuned to their emotions may nonetlieless experience an
emotion unique from the overall population,

If this were to occur, ilic-y may have

correctly identified their emotion with ease while receiving a poor accuracy' rating when
measured against the population.
This research will prove to be valuable as we will be able to determine why some
people may be slower than others at making emotional judgments,

II' this answer is

found, this research will help people understand how to use their emotions correctly in
order to make more efficient judgments and decisions.
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Method
Participnnts
The participants were 108 undergraduate college students of the University of
Mississippi.

Many were students in introductory psychology courses who were

participating for fulfillment of part of their course requirements. Students enrolled to
participate via a sign-up sheet on a bulletin board among various other project sign-up
sheets,

fhese participants were 38% male and 62% female, 73% Caucasian, 21%

African American, 4% Asian American, and 2% other.

Participants ranged in age from

1 8 to 33 with a mean age of 20. Participants were run in groups of 15.
Procedures
Participants were seated around tables in the computer lab and immediately given
their consent forms in which nothing about the experiment had been concealed. They
were openly told the nature of the experiment to encourage natural tendencies to be
shown in their data. Upon understanding and signing the consent form and after any
questions were answered, participants moved to individual computer cubicles. From
there, they positioned their headphones and began the experiment through the
AuthorWare program on the computer.
First, participants recorded their demographic information. After entering their
individual data, participants received a brief set of instructions, which outlined the
remainder of the experiment. In order to ensure that participants had clearly understood
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their instructions, 5 practice sound trial

s were administered llnoui^h the

At

this time, participants were allowed to adjust the solume setline .>n then computers for
comfort. For each sound, participants clicked the mouse to indicate ihe\ were* ready for
the sound to begin. After this click, the sound pla\ ed t or its lul l o sectinds followed by
silence until 8 seconds had concluded. Participants were eneouraeed to cliek their mouse
again quickly if they had been able to determine the emotion the sound elicited before Uie
sound had finished. If participants could not label the emotion iIicn experienced before
the end of the 8-second period, the program automatical 1\ brought them to the next
screen.
At this next screen, participants were asked to choose from 6 a\ ailable selections.
The first 4 represented words chosen by the experimenters as jitxssible emotional
responses to each sound. Also present as choices were "I don't know" and "Other.” At
the completion of these first 5 trial sounds, participants were made aware that they would
now begin the actual experiment. They were again informed of' the instructions and then
presented with the remaining 40 sounds in the experiment.
After participants completed the sound portion ol' the ex perinicnt, they were told
they would now complete several personality scales.

Instructions informed the

participants that, while this section was not timed, they were encouraged not to dwell too
long on these survey questions. These instructions also gave gencral directions for all the
surveys. Each question or statement for the survey

was prcsc311 ted on an individual

screen. The surveys were presented in the following order*

I MMS, mas, aim, and

EIS. After completing all surveys, participants were sho wn the debriefing page and
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thanked lor liioir contribution. Upon leaving the lab, participants were presented with
cards that \\\>iild acknowledge their participation to their professors. Participation
required an\ w here from 30 to 45 minutes, depending on each individual’s rate of
performance.
L motion Sounds Stinnili
Fort\ -ll\ e sounds were selected from a previous study in which each was given a
norm \ alue lor how much **pleasure, arousal, and dominance” (Bradley & Lang, 1999)
each exuded, fhese sounds had been digitally altered so that each played for a 6 second
period, fo prevent any mood adjustment, equal amounts of both positive and negative
affect sounds were chosen. These sounds were randomized and reproduced through the
AuthorWare program and heard by participants by means of individual headphones. The
time it took participants to respond to each sound was recorded by the computer program
as their reaction time, which was later correlated with the participants’ levels of each
personality trait.
Following each sound was a list of 4 emotion words from which participants
chose the closet description of the emotion elicited by the sound. These words were
chosen from a list of over 200 words that had been rated to ensure they were easily
identifiable and clear in their meanings (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987).
For each sound, 2 negative and 2 positive affect words were offered based upon possible
emotions the sound might have elicited in addition to the options ‘T don’t know” and
Other”.
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Personality Scales
To increase measurement reliability, we assessed each trait with 2 separate scales.
To measure clarity about emotion, we used the labeling subscale of the Mood Awareness
Scale (MAS; Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995) and the clarity subscale of the Trait Meta
Mood Scale(TMMS; Salovey et al. 1995). The labeling subscale of the MAS is designed
to measure how easily individuals can distinguish and label their present mood. This
consists of 5 statements such as “Right now I know what kind of mood I’m in” and "Vm
never really sure what I’m feeling.” Participants responded by expressing how' strongly
they agreed with these statements, with responses ranging from 1 to 6.

The clarity

subscale of the TMMS determined the clearness with which individuals understand their
emotions. Examples of the clarity subscale range from “I can’t make sense out of my
feelings” to “I believe in acting from the heart.” Participants again answered from 1 to 5.
To measure intensity about emotion, we used the Emotional Intensity Scale (EIS;
Bachorowski & Braaten, 1994) and the Affect Intensity Measure(AIM; Larsen & Diener,
1985, 1987). The EIS measures the intensity with which individuals typically experience
emotions. With 30 statements presented, participants were asked to choose the response
that most closely matches how they would normally feel. For each statement, 5 possible
answers are presented that express a range from a small change to an extreme change in
emotional state. An example statement is “I achieve a personal best in my favorite sport.
I feel....” Potential responses then range from “It has little effect on me” to “Ecstatic
top of the world.
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on

I lie second scale used to assess emotional intensity was the AIM. This 40tiLiestion sur\ e\ asks respondents to tell how they would react to a typical life event in the
hopes of e\ aliiating their individual levels of emotional intensity. Such situations are
presented as *'l f 1 complete a task 1 thought was impossible, I am ecstatic” and “Seeing a
picture of some \ iolent ear accident in a newspaper makes me feel sick to my stomach.”
Participants responded with a number I through 6. These answers ranged from “never”
to “al\\a> s", respeeti\ ely.
To measure attention to emotion, we used the mood monitoring subscale of the
MAS and the attention subscale of the TMMS. The mood monitoring subscale of the
MAS consisted of' 5 items designed to measure the amount of attention and weight
individuals tend to give toward the state of emotions they are currently experiencing.
This subscale asks for responses to such statements as “I find myself thinking about my
mood during the day” or “I don’t pay much attention to my moods.” Participants replied
by selecting a number ranging from 1 to 6, with 1 representing “disagree very much” and
6 representing “agree very much.

The attention subscale of the TMMS consists of 15

items intended to assess the attention paid to one’s state of emotions. Example items
include “I don’t usually care much about what I’m feeling” and “I pay a lot of attention to
how I feel” to which participants responded 1 to 5, which represent “strongly disagree”
and “strongly agree,” respectively.
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Results
The results of this study can be broken down into several different groups. The
first group of results is in response to the question of how the 3 personality traits of
clarity, intensity, and attention are related to participants’ speed and accuracy. The next
group answers how reaction times to emotional stimuli relate to participant accuracy.
The last group of results tells how the 3 personality traits are related to the use of the
responses “I don’t know” and “Other.
When we first began to examine the data for such relationships, no relationship
could be found between participant reaction time and any measured personality trait.
Participant reaction times were abnormally scattered, as shown in Figure 1, and exhibited
no relationship with any personality factor. We could, however, determine the presence
of correlations between these traits and participant accuracy scores. Accuracy was found
to be related to clarity about emotion, r = .22, p = .02, emotional intensity, r = .20, p .04, and attention to emotion, r= .24, p = .01. Therefore, across the whole population, a
participant with a high score in any of the personality traits often had a high accuracy
rating as well.
Upon further analysis, it soon became apparent why reaction times were not
related to any personality trait. A large number of participants, totaling exactly one-third
of the population, consistently listened to the complete sound without signaling that they
had labeled the emotion they were feeling. These participants not only allowed the sound
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to pla\' (Hit I II Its cntiret\. ihc> ol'icn allowed tlie computer program to move
auloinaticalK to ilie next screen alter an additional 2 seconds of silence. Their scores.
\\ hen riguivd into the w hole iiopulation, distorted the oxerall data and allowed for no
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signincanl findings xvhen looking for a straight correlation. Therefore, xvith one-third of
the reaction time scores ax'eraging around eight seconds xvhereas most participants
responded within three seconds, this group of participants xvas sectioned off as a separate
population.
When looking to define the boundaries for this separate population, the data
showed a clear division betxveen these 2 groups at the 5

second mark. As each sound

lasted 6 seconds, any participant with an average reaction time over 5 _ seconds xvas
16

The participants who consislcnll\ and

placed in this second, slower population.

actively responded before the completion of each sound will be classified as Ciroup 1 {n
72) while the participants who rarely, if ever, actively responded are clustered into Ciroup
2 {n = 36). To measure the accuracy, response times, and personalil> trait differences
between these 2 groups, t-tests were used. This type of statistical test allows for a
comparison of 2 separate populations against a particular factor, such as between rate of
accuracy and levels of emotional intelligence.
We then examined the data further to ascertain the effects of accuracy ratings. In
order to determine what would be deemed as the most accurate emotional response, we
utilized the consensus scoring method. In other words, the answer that was most often
chosen by participants for a particular sound was labeled as the correct answer for that
stimulus. In doing this, the sounds bear, court sport, dog growl, native, pig, sports crowd,
and puppy cry were found to be without a clear consensus as to the correct answer.
Therefore, these 7 sounds were not used to determine the accuracy ratings for
participants. The data from the remaining 33 sounds were used to calculate this accuracy
figure.
Upon examining the collected data, a programming error was discovered that
invalidated the figures collected from the Mood Awareness Scale. This error nullified a
subscale measure for both clarity about emotion and attention to emotion. Therefore, the
clarity and attention subscales of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale were used as the sole
assessment of an individual’s level of these personality traits. Next, the scores from the 2
scales that measured intensity, the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM) and the Emotional
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Inlcnsii\ Sc;ilc ( I IS), were a\ciagcd. As the AIM responses ranged from 1 to 6and the
Ids llgurcs from I to 5. these seores were standardized to ensure that equal weight was
gi\ cn to each scale.
When iinal\ zing the data for Group 1, the fast group, no significant correlations
were l\uind between reaction time and any of the 3 personality traits. In fact, their
ec^rrehition \ alues were all almost zero, with a zero value meaning there is absolutely no
relationship between these quantities. These scores were r= -.01, p = .80 for clarity
about emtnion. = .01. p = .92 for emotional intensity, and r= .06, p = .61 for attention to
emotions.

I heret'ore, according to this data, individuals who are able to define their

emotions more clearly, e.xpericnce their emotions rather strongly, or are more attentive to
their emotions should not be e.xpected to identify an elicited emotion any faster than an
individual kwv in these traits.
Also despite expectations from the fast group’s data, accuracy in reporting an
emotion was not significantly related to emotional intensity (r = .16, p = .19), nor was
accuracy related to an individual’s level of emotional attention (r = .12, p = .33).
However, it was clearly found that an individual’s accuracy rating was significantly
related to that individual’s degree of clarity (r = .30, p = .01). For that reason, it can be
said that individuals who are more able to identify precisely the emotions they are feeling
are also more able to report these emotions more accurately.

For Group 2, those who responded after the sound had ended, reaction time
correlations could not be measured. As almost all of the slow group’s average reaction
times were the same at 8 seconds, it was impossible to determine the effects these
18

personality traits may have had on participant reaction times.

When measuring

correlations between accuracy ratings and these personality traits I'or the slow group, no
correlation was found with clarity (r = .04, p = .83) or intensity (r = .13, p ^ .46).
Attention to emotions, however, was significantly related to an indi\ idual's level of
accuracy (r- .29, p - .09). This measurement is only marginally signiUcant due to the
small population size of the slow group.
Using a t-test to compare the 2 groups’ personality trait measures, it was found
that the fast group(m - .16) had significantly greater emotional intensity ratings(m .14) than the slow group(m = -.28), t(106) = 2.33, p = .02, as well as higher attention
scores than the slow group (m = -.31), t(106) = 2.36, p = .02.

Clarity measures,

however, did not prove to be significantly greater for the fast group {m = .09) than the
slow group {m = -.18), t(106)= 1.30, p = .20. Therefore, participants who had a higher
individual level of emotional intensity or attention to emotion were more likely to
interrupt the sound actively in order to signal the presence of an identifiable emotion (see
Figure 2).
Next, we examined the data to find if a participant’s average reaction time was
related to that participant’s level of accuracy. As seen in Figure 3, it was found that the
fast group’s accuracy rating(w = 18.72) was significantly higher than the rating for the
slow group (m = 16.63), t (106) = 2.93, p = .004. Thus, participants who responded
quicker and actively signaled that they had identified their emotions were more accurate
at naming those emotions than those participants who waited until after the sound was
complete to identify their emotions. Simply put, the faster the response, the better.
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1 he last SCI ot' results answers liow the responses "1 don't know" and "Other"
uei e related to ilie

personalit\ traits and response times. Immediately, it was found that

\ ei \ le\s |iartieipaiits aeiiudl\ utili/ed these response options. In fact out of 33 sounds.
onl\ 1

■>o

n l

>! ixirtieipants used "1 don't know" on 3 sounds or more, while only 11% used

0.4
! a Fast
● ■ Slow

'w)

cz

0

●

-0.4

II
IntensitN'

h'inure 2.

Attention

Clarity

Mean personality trait scores as a

function of population group.

■‘Other” on 3 sounds or more. Therefore, tests measuring the use of these responses in
relation to levels of these personality traits were inconclusive as these options were rarely
selected.
Interestingly, it was found that the slow group (m = 2.0) used “I don’t know” as
an option significantly more often than the fast group {m = 1.31), t(106) = -1.95, p = .05.
This may indicate that, when using this response after the full 8 seconds had elapsed, the
slow group w'as still unclear of w'hat emotions they were experiencing and may have
20

needed the extra time to label the emotions the\’ were feeling. i Lirther. the slow giaiup
(in= 1.97) did not use "Other' as an option an>' more than the fast groLii-) (in

1 .65).
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t(106) = -.77, p

.45. As this response is still indicative of a specific emotion, albeit

unlisted, this option suggests that the participants were still able to identify clearly and
attentively the emotions they were feeling as a result of the stimuli.
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Discussion
1 he rcsulis of' tliis research have more than met my hesitant expectations. It has
also j')ro\ ed inereasinglx interesting in that it has presented as many, if not more,
questions than answ ers. But. as research often does, the answers from this work will lead
to further, more compelling findings, and these questions will likewise provide the
pathwa\ for t)btaining them.
fo reiterate the significant findings, it was found initially that if a participant
exhibited a higher rating on any of the three measured personality traits, that person
would be more likely to give more accurate answers to emotionally relevant questions.
with attention to emotion being the most related, clarity about emotion second, and
emotional intensity slightly less related. Upon seeing not even a thin connection between
these personality traits and a participant’s average reaction time, it was discovered that
our population consisted of two distinct subgroups. For data analysis purposes, the first
subgroup (Group 1) consisted of those participants who actively responded before the
stimulus had ended as the instructions had encouraged. Group 2 was made of those
participants who almost always allowed the computer to move automatically to the next
step.
For the fast group, the only significant finding was that those participants who had
a higher degree of clarity were more likely to deliver more accurate responses. The slow
group also offered only one significant finding in that these participants, when giving a
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greater amount of attention to their emotions, also reported more accurate answ ers. In
comparing these two groups, the fast group was found to ha\e both higher emotional
attention levels and higher emotional intensity scores. Also, members of the last group
were more likely to give more accurate responses. Lastly, it was found tliat members of
the slow group were more likely to choose “I donU know” as a response tlian members ol
the fast group.
With little research previously done on this specific area, it is hard to sa> how
telling these results are. From this experiment, it does seem that

higher le\el ot

emotional intelligence leads to more accurate answers to questions about emotion. Ol the
measured personality traits, emotional clarity seems to predict accuracy best lor people
who can label their emotions faster. Emotional attention best tells this for those who
appear to be slower at labeling their emotions. Also, people who are more able to define
their emotions quickly will give a more accurate definition.
When attempting to generalize these findings to the community at large, it
becomes necessary to define the fundamental difference between these two groups, We
must determine what places a person into the fast or slow group. Perhaps there is a set ot
people, making up possibly one-third of the population, which requires significantly and
unpredictably longer periods of time to decide completely and satisfyingly what emotion
they are feeling at a given moment. This would not imply any sort of mental deficiency,
merely an inability to assign a term quickly to their emotions or a hesitance to label these
emotions concretely. This hesitance could be due to a stigma against hasty behavior, a
nurtured tendency from a parent, or a number of different factors.
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● \ sccoiul possibi!ii\ arises from the knowledge that a great number of
participants were IS to

years old. These participants, most likely freshmen or

sophonu>res in an inirodiietory ps>eholog\ course, were involved in this experiment
simpl\ because ihe\ had to be for their class. These participants, as well as those
uppcrclassincn or e\ en ."^0 > ear olds, may have felt less than compelled to perform to the
best of their abilil\ .

l he> may ha\e breezed over or skipped the instructions, thus

creating little to no understanding of how to complete the experiment properly. This may
have led them to think they were supposed to wait and listen to the complete sound
be lore responding.
Based on this study alone, it is impossible to say with authority which possibility
IS more accurate. riierc is. howex'er, some evidence to support the first notion that these
subjects did require more time. When time ran out and the computer program moved
forward forcing these participants to choose the emotion they were experiencing, they
were more likely to select "I don't know” than members of the fast group. This evidence
suggests that when it came time to label their emotion, these participants still needed
more time to define their experienced emotion fully.
Another question brought up by this study involves the sounds that were not used
in determining a participant’s accuracy score. These sounds lacked a clear consensus as
to their correct emotional responses. It is impossible to tell if this lack of consensus was
simply due to poor word choices by the experimenters for emotion options. Perhaps
these particular sounds elicit similar ranges of emotions in all populations. It is also
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possible that there is something different. ma\ be a Iiigher lc\cl of one of ihc personality
traits, which leads certain people to feel a dil'l'erenl emotional response to these cues.
Another issue arises from the programming error that eliminated the Mood
Awareness Scale scores.

While other .scales reported these same \ariablcs and are

satisfactorily reliable on their own, a second measure ot these traits would pro\ ide that
much more reliability of measurement. These added \ alues ctuild simpK confirm the
present scores or redefine the levels of these measured traits. Such a redefinition could
alter any findings relevant to the traits measured by this scale.
A last question involves the environmental cITects on participants,
experimenters reported that they could clearly make (uit

Some

the sounds coming from

participants’ headphones. As each participant heard the sounds in a random order, it has
been suggested that participants could likely have their emotional e.xpcrience unwittingly
influenced by the sound from their neighbors headphones, for instance, participants
would possibly experience

amusemenf’ rather than “annoyance" at hearing a belch

when they can also hear kids in park from their neighbors headphones.
In order to find reasonable and valid answers to the questions raised from this
study, some suggestions have led to changes in the experiment itself that will be
implemented upon a second running of the study. First, instructions for the study will be
made clearer to encourage participants to interrupt the sound as soon as they have labeled
the emotion they are experiencing. Perhaps the experimenter may demonstrate a quick
response to an easily discernable emotion and a slower response to a more complex
stimulus.
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SccihkIK. tlic omolional cues for which no consensus was formed will be
included in die I'uturc stud> Just as they were found in this study. We feel that, while
these sounds cannot he used to determine accuracy ratings, the remaining 33 sounds
prov ide sul'fieieni data to giv e a valid accuracy score. Also, the addition of such sounds
w ill serv e to keep participants on their toes. When a sound has no clear correct response,
participants w ill he forced to scrutinize their emotional experiences further.
l\u' the remaining questions, simple modifications should be necessary for the
removal o\' their consequences. For the invalid scores from the MAS,a simple glitch will
he removed iVom the program in order to add these values to the personality trait
assessments.

l or the environmental concern, better quality headphones will be

distributed to participants in anticipation of the removal of these excessive stimuli. Once
these issues are resolved and a second study run, we will likely have more valid and
interesting answers. It is also possible that more such questions will arise, providing for
another step toward finding solid and specific solutions. Upon finding such exact
connections, the reach of their application is endless.
As mentioned earlier, higher levels of these traits are linked to better Job
performance (Ferdowsian, 2003) and relationship stability (Lopes et al., 2003). If we
learn how these traits create this effect or what exact mixture provides for the best results,
it seems likely that employers could utilize such measures to determine which candidate
would be best for employment. This information would be especially useful for types of
Jobs where emotions are significant. For instance, an elementaiy school principle would
most likely want to hire a kindergarten teacher who is in touch with her emotions and
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better able to understand them. Also, people ma\ use ihis information to some degree
when selecting a future mate. If someone is highl> aiiuned to liis or her emotions, finding
someone with this similar trait seems more rele\ant lor eompatihilit\ than an astrological
sign.
As we have found that individual dilTerenees oeeur in the le\ els of these traits, we
may possibly be able to find conclusively that a high degree of emotional elarit\' leads to
more

accurate decision making in the future, It this is found It) he true, improving an

individual’s amount of this trait could lead to belter decisions. /\nd. it this indixidual can
make better decisions, it can be argued that this person could lead a happier and healthier
life consequently. Also, if our second study continues to show a subgroup of the
population that requires more time to evaluate their emotions, we may also be able to
show that this subgroup is consistently less accurate than the remainder of' the population.
If this is found, people may be able to overcome their subgroup classification in order to
make better decisions by teaching themselves to increase their emotional intelligence
ratings.
The possibilities for this research are endless, liach new study will likely open
new avenues and raise new questions for further analysis. With each step, more answers
will be revealed and more opportunities will arise for improving the decisions we make.
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Appendix A
Practice Sounds
1. Sports Crowd
2. Boy Laugh
3. Applause
4. Beethoven
5. Baby Laugh

[

!
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I
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Appendix B
List of Sounds
1 . lki//.cr

21. Belch

2. I cinale Scream 2

22. TypevvTiter

I'nuine failure

23. Nose Blow-

4. Bees

24. Puppy Cry

5. Raging f ire

25- Tropical

6. Dog Growl

26. Bag Pipes

7. 1 low linu Rain

27. Carousel

S. Baby Cry

28. Music Box

9. Sirens

29. Clap Game

10. Office 2

30. Kids in Park

1 1. f uneral

31. Bach

12. War

32. Court Sport

13. Pig

33. Giggling

14. Jack Hammer

34. Roller Coaster

15. Male Snore

35. Natives

16. Wind

36. Choir

17. Bear

37. Guitar

18. Cuckoo

38. Colonial Music

19. Tomcat

39. Laughing

20. Rooster

40. Cardinal
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Appendix C
Mood Awareness Seale

Below are some statements that may or nia> not be i\ pieal ol ynu. Please indicate
how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements. 1 Ising ilie iollow ing scale,
write a number in the blank before each statement to indicate \oLir answer.

1
disagree
very
much

4

2
disagree
somewhat

disagree
slightly

agree
slightly

s
agree
somew hat

6
agree
very
much

L I have a hard time labeling my feelings.
2. I'm usually "tuned in" to my emotions.
3. I fmd myself thinking about my mood during the da\'.
4. I am sensitive to changes in my mood.
5. I have trouble explaining my feelings.
6. On my way home from work or school, 1 find myself evaluating my mood.
7. Right now I know what kind of mood I'm in.
_ 8. I often evaluate my mood.
_ 9. I'm never really sure what I'm feeling.
_ 10.1 don't pay much attention to my moods.
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Appendix D
Trait Meta-Mood Scale
Please read eaeli statement and decide whether or not you agree witli it. Place a number
in tlie blank line next to each statement using the following scale:
5 = strongly agree
4 = somewhat agree
3 = neither agree nor disagree
2 = somewhat disagree
1 = strongly disagree
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

1 tr\ tc’* think good thoughts no matter how badly I feel.
People w ould be better off if they felt less and thought more.
1 dim't think it’s worth paying attention to your emotions or moods.
I don't usually care much about what I'm feeling.
Sometimes 1 can't tell what my feelings are.
I am rareh confused about how I feel.

7. IT'elings gi\ e direction to life.
8. Although I am sometimes sad, I have a mostly optimistic outlook.
_ 9. When 1 am upset I realize that the "good things in life" are illusions.
10. I believe in acting from the heart.
1 1 . I can never tell how I feel.
12. fhe best w'ay for me to handle my feelings is to experience them to the fullest.
13. When I become upset I remind myself of all the pleasures in life.
14. My belief and opinions always seem to change depending on how I feel.
15. I am often aware of my feelings on a matter.
16. 1 am usually confused about how I feel.
17. One should nev^er be guided by emotions.
18. 1 never give in to my emotions.
19. Although I am sometimes happy, I have a mostly pessimistic outlook.
_ 20. I feel at ease about my emotions.
21. 1 pay a lot of attention to how^ I feel.
_ 22. I can't make sense out of my feelings.
23. I don't pay much attention to my feelings.
24. I often think about my feelings.
25. 1 am usually very clear about my feelings.
26. No matter how badly I feel, I try to think about pleasant things.
27. Feelings are a weakness humans have.
28. 1 usually know my feelings about a matter.
29. It is usually a waste of time to think about your emotions.
30. I almost always know exactly how I am feeling.
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Appendix \i
Affect Intensity Measure
DIRECTIONS: The following questions refer to emotional reaeli^ins to i\ pieal
life-events. Please indicate how YOU react to these e\ enls by placing a luimbcr from the
following scale in the blank space preceding each item. Please base \ cuir ^inswers on how
YOU react, not on how you think others react or how you think a person should react.

NEVER
1
1.
2.
j.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

ALMOST
NEVER OCCASIONALLY
2
j

USUALIA'
4

ALMOST
ALWAYS
s

.ALWAYS
6

When I accomplish something difficult 1 I'eel delighted or elated.
When I feel happy it is a strong type ol'exuberance.
I enjoy being with other people very much.
I feel pretty bad when I tell a lie.
When I solve a small personal problem, I feel euphoric.
My emotions tend to be more intense than those of' m(.)st people.
My happy moods are so strong that I feel like Tm in hea\ en.
I get overly enthusiastic.
If I complete a task I thought was impossible, I am ecstatic.
My heart races at the anticipation of some exciting event.
Sad movies deeply touch me.
When I’m happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than
being zestful and aroused.
When I talk in front of a group for the first time my voice gets shaky and
my heart races.
When something good happens, I'm usually much more jubilant than
others.
My friends might say I'm emotional.
The memories I like the most are of those times when I felt content and
peaceful rather than zestful and enthusiastic.
The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me strongly.
When I'm feeling well it’s easy for me to go from being in a good mood to
being really joyful.
"Calm and cool" could easily describe me.
When I'm happy I feel like I'm bursting with joy.
Seeing a picture of some violent car accident in a newspaper makes me
feel sick to my stomach.
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N1 AIR

24
25
26
27
28
29
M)
.2 1
.22

24
25
26
27
28
29
40

AI.MOSr
NIAl-R OCCASIONALLY

USUALLY
4

ALMOST
ALWAYS

ALWAYS
6

When I'm liappy I feel veiy energetic.
\\ hen 1 receive a reward I become overjoyed.
\\ hen 1 .succeed at something, my reaction is calm and contentment.
\\ hen 1 do something wrong I have strong feelings of shame and guilt.
I can remain calm e\ en on the most trying days.
When things are going good I feel 'on top of the world'.
When 1 get angr>^ it's eas\- for me to still be rational and not overreact.
When 1 know I ha\ e done something \ ery well, I feel relaxed and content
rather than excited and elated.
When I do feel anxiety it is normally ver\' strong.
M\ negati\ e moods are mild in intensity.
When I am excited over something I w'ant to share my feelings with
e\ cryone.
When I feel happiness, it is a quiet type of contentment.
M>’ friends would probably say I'm a tense or 'high-strung' person.
When I'm happy I bubble over wdth energy.
When I feel guilty, this emotion is quite strong.
I would characterize my happy moods as closer to contentment than Joy.
When someone compliments me, I get so happy I could 'burst'.
When I am nervous I get shaky all over.
When I am happy the feeling is more like contentment and inner calm than
one of exhilaration and excitement.
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Appendix I'
Emotional Intensit\ Scale
Imagine yourself in the following situations and then indicate the numhci of the answ er
that best describes how you usually feel.

1. Someone compliments me. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.

5. Someone 1 am \ cr\ ailraclcd to asks me
out for coffee. 1 feel:
1. Ecstatic--on top ol'the wcu*ld.
2. Very thrilled.
3. Thrilled.

2. Mildly pleased.
3. Pleased.
4. Very pleased.
5. EcstatiC“On top of the
world.
2. I think about awful things that
might happen. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little worried.
3. Worried.

4. Mildly thrilled.
5. It has little elTecl cm me.
6. Something frustrates me. I leel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little frustrated.
3. Frustrated.
4. Very frustrated.
5. So extremely tense and frustrated
that my muscles knot up.

4. Very worried.
5. So extremely worried that I
can almost think of
nothing else.
3. I am happy. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. Mildly happy.
3. Happy.

7. I achieve a personal best in my favorite
sport. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. Mildly pleased.
3. Happy.
4. Very happy.
5. Ecstatic—on top of the world.

4. Extremely happy.
5. Euphoric~so happy I could
burst.
4. I see a child suffer. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little upset.
3. Upset.
4. Very upset.
5. So extremely upset I feel
sick to my stomach.

8. I say or do something I should not have
done. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A twinge of guilt.
3. Guilty.
4. Very guilty.
5. Extremely guilty.
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1 am al the j'>ark w ith a l'a\oritc
child. 1 foci:
1 . It has little clToct on me.
2. SIightl\ pla\ fill.
3. ria\ fill.
4. \'cr> pla\ fill.
5. .S(^ pla\ fill I feel like
running around the
park.

14. I have an embarrassing experience. I
feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little ill at ease.
3. Embarrassed.
4. Ver\' embarrassed.
5. So embarrassed I want to die.

10. Someone criticizes me. I feel:
1 . It has little effect on me.
2. I am a hit taken aback.
3. I 'pset.
4. Ver\ upset.
5. So extremeh' upset 1 could
cr\ .

15. Someone I know is rude to me. I feel:
1. So incredibly hurt I could cry.
2. Veiy hurt.
3. Hurt.
4. A little hurt.
5. It has little effect on me.

1 1 . I recei\e positi\e feedback from
a fa\orite professor. I feel:
1 . Thrilled—so happy I could
burst.

16. I am at a fun party. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little lighthearted.
3. Lively.
4. Very lively.
5. So lively that I almost feel like a
new person.

2. Ver\' happy.
3. Happy.
4. Mildly pleased.
5. It has little effect on me.
12. People do things to annoy me. I
feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little bothered.
3. Annoyed.
4. Very annoyed.
5. So extremely annoyed I
feel like hitting them.

17. Something wonderful happens to me. I
feel:

13. I hear a speech by a leader
whose ideas I respect. I feel:
1 . It has little effect on me.

18.1 see a sad movie. I feel:
1. So extremely sad that I feel like
weeping.
2. Very sad.

2. Slightly impressed.
3. Impressed.
4. Very impressed.
5. Inspired—so impressed I
have a new sense of
purpose.

1. Extremely joyful-exuberant.
2. Extremely glad.
3. Glad.
4. A little glad.
5. It has little effect on me.

3. Sad.
4. A little sad.
5. It has little effect on me.
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19. I have accomplished something
valuable. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little satisfied.
3. Satisfied.

i

24. I am iinoKcd in a situation in wliich I
must do well, sucli as an important
exam or job intoiA icw . I feel;
1 . It lias little elTeet on me.
2. SligluK anxious.
3. .'\nxioLis.
4. Ver\ anxious.
5. So extremel\ anxious 1 ean think
ol' nothing else.

4. Very satisfied.
5. So satisfied it's as if my
entire life was
worthwhile.
20. Something angers me. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. A little angry.
3. Angry.
4. Very angry.
5. So angry I could explode.

21. A person with whom I am

25. My boss gives me an unexpected pat on
the back and says,'nice work'. I feel:
1. Exuberant—m\ da\ is perfect.
2. Very gratilled.
3. Gratified.
4. Slightly gratified.
5. It has little effect on me.
26. I am involved in a romantic
relationship. I feel:
1. So consumed with passion 1 can
think of'nothing else.
2. Very passionate.
3. Passionate.

involved prepares me a
candlelight dinner. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. Slightly romantic.
3. Romantic.

4. Mildly passionate.
5. It has little effect on me.

4. Very romantic.
5. So passionate nothing else
matters.
22. I have hurt someone's feelings. I
feel:

27. I attend the funeral of a casual

1. It has little effect on me.

acquaintance. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.

2. A little sorry,
3. Sorry.

2. Mildly sad.
3. Sad.

4. Very sorry,
5. So extremely sorry I will
do anything to make it
up to them.

4. Very sad.
5. So extremely sad that I cannot
control my tears.

23. lam late for work or school and
I find myself in a traffic jam.
I feel:

28- I am in an argument. I feel:
1. It has little effect on me.
2. Mildly angry.
3. Angry.
4. Very angry.
5. So incredibly angry I find it
difficult to remain composed.

1. In a rage.
2. Very angry.
3. Angry.
4. Slightly angry.
5. It has little effect on me.
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2^). !*a\ iiicnis on m\ hills arc
t)\crJuc. I led;
1 . In such a panic 1 can think
of nothing else.
2. \'cr> \M>rricd.
2. \\ orried.
4. Mildl> worried.
5. It has little elTeet on me.

30. .Someone surprises me w ith a
gi ll. I leel:
1 . It has little elTeet on me.
2. .\ little grateful.
3. Cl rale I 111.
4. Ver\ grateful.
5. So grateful I want to run
out and buy them a
uill in return.
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